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Abstract:The purpose of the present work is to focus and analyze the profiles of the interpretation 
of EU law through the role and the position carried out ab initio until today CJEU, playing its role 
not only interpretative, expansive but also creative. Interpretation in a community sense includes 
the development of law and the activity of the Court is fundamentally legal production through the 
interpretation and development of law. The interpretative strategy developed through CJEU takes 
into account the sui generis character of EU system and its right by adopting interpretative choices 
functional to the development of integration process as a fundamental objective of the treaty.
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Resumo: O obejtivo do presente trabalho é analisar os perfis da interpretação do direito da UE por 
intermédio do papel e da posição exercida ab initio até hoje pelo TJUE, ao desempenhar não apenas seu 
papel interpretativo e expansivo, mas, também criativo. A interpretação no sentido comunitário inclui 
o desenvolvimento do direito, e, a atividade do Tribunal é a produção legal por meio da interpretação e 
desenvolvimento do direito. A estratégia interpretativa desenvolvida pelo TJUE leva em consideração 
o caráter sui generis do sistema da UE e seu direito, ao adotar escolhas interpretativas e funcionais 
em prol do desenvolvimento do processo de integração como objetivo fundamental do tratado.
Palavras-chave: interpretação do direito da UE, TJUE, direito da UE, segurança jurídica.
SUMMARY: Introduction. 1. The absence in the treaties establishing provisions 
relating to interpretation: the role of the Court of Justice of the European Union. 
2. EU’s law interpretation methods. 3. The reasons for the prevalence of teleologi-
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cal interpretation in the first decades of European integration. 4. The importance 
in EU law of interpretation rules applicable to international treaties. Concluding 
remarks.
Introduction
Identification and affirmation of treaties interpretative rules has acceler-
ated especially after the establishment of the European community, today EU 
when the passage from international law’s coexistence to cooperation has led 
to multiplication of international agreements, making more pressing the prob-
lem concerning their legal regulation including that of their interpretation. For 
interpretation it is necessary to use the natural and ordinary meaning of treaty 
terms considered in their context according to good faith to and in the light of 
international law principles. The natural and ordinary meaning of a term can 
be set aside if it is established that the same must be interpreted differently 
through subsidiary means of interpretation with a simplifying list of prepara-
tory works, the practice followed, in our thing by means of the Court of Justice of 
the European Union (CJEU) in the effective application of the treaty and the pur-
pose of the latter. A first interpretative strategy is known as an objective method 
of interpretation (textual or literal) which gives prevalent emphasis to the text 
of the treaty, which is deemed to correspond to the will expressed by the con-
tracting parties. In this regard, it is believed that these are bound by the treaty 
as they have, as a rule and according to the ordinary treaty formation process, 
participated in its negotiation and have authenticated the text by signing it and 
have decided to oblige themselves to comply with the ratification (GAGARDINER, 
2015; FITZMAURICE, 2017).
Another strategy is known as a subjective (historical) method, which is 
aimed at seeking the effective will of contracting parties, which could also be dif-
ferent from that expressed in the text of the treaty. The application of this method 
may allow the differences in the interests of the aforementioned parties to be 
re-interpreted, as well as between national rules and practices in terms of inter-
pretation. And given that the treaties are by their nature a compromise between 
distinct positions, the method in question can allow the contractors themselves 
to take an interpretative part, a part of what they have granted through negotia-
tion, formalized in the text of the treaty.
Another interpretative strategy is known as a functional (teleological) 
method that enhances the purpose for which the treaty is concluded, interpret-
ing the text in function, precisely of it. This method is inherently neutral since 
the result it leads to depends on the content of the specific standard to be inter-
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preted. When the aims of a treaty are broad and indeterminate, its application 
is likely to produce an extensive interpretation of it with the consequence of 
limiting the sovereignty and autonomy of the contractors to a greater extent. 
The teleological method is not only a glare of one of the other two depend-
ing on whether the text or the will of the parties is enhanced, in our case the 
participating states. It is the manifestation of an interpretative strategy that, 
more than the others, shifts attention from the legislator to the interpreter who 
has the task of seeking the rational end pursued by the norm. It is a dynamic 
method, since it can adapt the treaty to the changed context of the international 
community, a rectius of the participating states speaking for the Union treaties. 
This is a more creative method.
Such strategies are susceptible to a more or less “pure” application and the 
methods attributable to them can also be ordered differently. This depends as 
mentioned by the approach that characterizes the interpreter as well as the type 
of treaty and the context considered from time to time. The positive conception 
favors objective interpretation because otherwise through the teleological inter-
pretation the interpreter could transform the norm while remaining firm that 
the subdivision of the interpretation of treaties into the various strategies indi-
cated seems more convincing and corresponding to the Union practice.
1. The Absence in the Treaties Establishing Provisions Relating 
to Interpretation: the role of the court of justice of the 
European Union 
In EU legal order there are no written rules that determine how it should 
be interpreted. CJEU1 has made up for this lack that unites both primacy law 
including the Charter of the Fundamental Rights of the European Union (CFREU) 
and derivative law, which in its jurisprudence has identified and applied some 
methods of interpretation of EU law (POIARES MADURO, 2007; RITLING , 2016), 
qualified as unwritten general principles of EU law.
CJEU has recognized these methods of interpretation taking into account 
those used by the judicial organs of member states in order to interpret the 
respective internal legal systems (KUTSCHER, 1976; MERTENS DE WILMARS, 
1985; VAN RAEPENBURSCH, 2016), as well as the interpretative methods appli-
cable to international treaties. However, faced with the need to interpret the rules 
1 “(...) the sacred task, indeed the core function, of the judge in both the EU and the United States 
is the interpretation of law” (LENAERTS, 2007). See also:. «Le juge n’existe qu’e fonction de son 
indèpendance et cette indèpendance concerne en premier lieu la dèfinition des sources du droit et 
le mèthode d’interpètation (...)» (PESCATORE, 1994).
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of an unusual and peculiar legal system such as EU, which does not include only a 
set of reciprocal rules created by treaties connected to each other, CJEU has devel-
oped its own interpretative strategy and its own system of juridical argumenta-
tion (BEHR, 1958-1959; KOOPMANS, 1991; EVERLING, 1994; FENNELLY, 1997; 
SCHIEMANN, 2005; FAHEN, 2016), affirming its role not only as a judge of the 
rights and obligations of member states but also of individuals. In this perspec-
tive CJEU has also played its creative role. Interpretation in the community sense 
includes the development of law and “the activity of the Court is fundamentally 
legal production through the interpretation and development of the law”2. This 
is not unusual for courts and in the present case is the current art. 19, par. 1 TEU 
to assign exclusively to CJEU the task (LENAERTS; GUTIÉRREZ-FONS, 2013) of 
ensuring compliance with the law “in the interpretation” of treaties3, while art. 
267 TFEU commissioned to interpret the entire legal system of EU law through 
the mechanism of preliminary reference.
In some celebrated judgments it has stated that EU is “a new legal order in 
the field of international law” (CJEU, 1963)4 (note that the final sentence refer-
ring to international law is eliminated in subsequent rulings that take up this 
statement) (CJEU, 1968)5, that the treaty is the “constitutional charter” of a law 
2 “(...) il est indèniable que devant les tergiversations du monde politique, elle (la Corte) a ainsi 
rèussi à faire prèvaloir sa conception de la construction europèenne (...)” (SCHOCKWEILER, 1995). 
See also: BAILLEUX, H. A. DUMONT. Droit institutionnel de l’Union europèenne. Le pacte consitution-
nel europèeen en contexte. Bruzelles : Bruylant, 2015.
3 “(...) the overarching principle guiding the court of justice’s interpretative approach” (LENAERTS, 
2007) see also: who believes that art. 19 should not be interpreted as “a balk check-provision” as 
it binds the court and the court to ensure compliance with the “within their own jurisdiction” right 
(DE WAELE, 2010).
4 The fundamental characteristics of the Community legal order are in particular its pre-eminence 
over the rights of the Member States and the direct effect of a whole series of rules which apply to 
the citizens of those States, as well as to the States themselves. For an analysis on the fundamental 
principles of EU law (CJEU, 1963).
5 Opinion in case 1/91 of 14 December 1991, ECLI: EU:C:1991:490, I-06079, parr. 39-40; In Opinion 
1/91, on the first EEA agreement, the CJEU proclaimed the constitutional character of the EU, as-
serting that this constitutional nature distinguished it from international law. In Opinion 1/00 the 
Court stated more specifically: “(...) preservation of the autonomy of the Union legal order requires 
therefore, first, that the essential character of the powers of the (Union) and its institutions as 
conceived in the Treaty remain unaltered (...) it requires that the procedures for ensuring uniform 
interpretation of the rules of the (...) Agreement and for resolving disputes will not have the effect 
of binding the (Union) and its institutions, in the exercise of their internal powers, to a particular 
interpretation of the rules of (Union) law referred to in that agreement (...)”. See also the Opinion 
1/00, Opinion pursuant to Article 300(6) EC-Proposed agreement between the European Com-
munity and non-Member States on the establishment of a European Common Aviation Area) of 18 
April 2002, ECLI:EU:C:2002:231, I-03493, par. 12-13, to which par. 12 states that: “Ensuring the 
autonomy of the Community legal order therefore presupposes, on the one hand, that the com-
petences of the Community and its institutions, as conceived in the Treaty, are not distorted: “(...) 
since the draft agreement substantially establishes a new jurisdictional structure, it is necessary 
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community (CJEU, 1986)6 and that the transfer of powers from states to the com-
munity (today EU) involves a “definitive limitation of their sovereign powers” 
(CJEU, 1964)7. These are all very significant statements that show a tendency 
of CJERU to bring EU closer to a state subject (MERTENS DE WILMARS, 1985)8, 
to recall, in the first place, the fundamental elements of the legal system and the judicial system 
of the Union, as conceived by the founding Treaties and developed by the jurisprudence of the 
Court in order to assess the compatibility with those elements of the TB institution (...)”. In Opinion 
1/00 the Court stated more specifically: “(...) preservation of the autonomy of the Union legal order 
requires therefore, first, that the essential character of the powers of the (Union) and its institu-
tions as conceived in the Treaty remain unaltered (...) it requires that the procedures for ensuring 
uniform interpretation of the rules of the (...) Agreement and for resolving disputes will not have 
the effect of binding the (Union) and its institutions, in the exercise of their internal powers, to a 
particular interpretation of the rules of (Union) law referred to in that agreement (...)”. from the 
perspective of the autonomy of EU law, it is not clear at all that the principle of mutual trust, as a 
“specific characteristic” of EU law, trumps the protection of fundamental rights. It is true that the 
principle is a cornerstone of the Area of Freedom Security and Justice, and that the relevant TFEU 
provisions make several references to mutual recognition. But the protection of fundamental rights 
is a foundational EU value, and the TFEU’s opening provision on the AFSJ predicates the area on 
respect for fundamental rights-such respect is also a “specific characteristic” of EU law. Accord-
ing to our opinion arbitral tribunals have no obligation to keep up to date and take account of the 
CJEU’s case law when the disputing parties invoke EU law arguments. Tribunals can of course do 
so either on their own initiative or by hearing the parties and expert witnesses, but the essential 
question is whether the general ability of arbitral tribunals to interpret and apply EU law, to be dis-
cussed further below, constitutes a problem in light of Opinions 1/91 and 1/00. Situations where 
the CJEU’s rulings are open to different interpretations, or where the Court has not clarified the 
meaning of specific EU law provisions may arise, and this will compel the tribunals to interpret the 
relevant rulings and provisions in one or another way. See for details: B. DE WITTE, EU law: How 
autonomous is its order?, in Zeitschrift für Öffentliches Recht, 65, 2010, pp. 162ss. P. JAN KUIJPER, 
J. WOUFERS, F. HOFFMEISTER, The law of EU external relations: Cases, materials and commentary 
on the EU as an international legal actor, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2018, pp. 520ss. M. DER-
LÉN, J. LINDOLM, The Court of Justice of the EU: Multidisciplinary perspectives, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 2018. F. CASTILLO DE LA TORRE, Opinion 1/00, Proposed agreement on the estab-
lishment of a European Common Aviation Area, in Common Market Law Review, 39 (6), 2002, pp. 
1373-1393 pp. 1392ss. 
6 In the same spirit see: C-2/88, IMM, Zwartveld of 13 July 1990, ECLI:EU:C:1990:440 I-04405. 
C-314/91, Beate Weber v. European Parliament of 23 March 1993, ECLI:EU:C:1993109: I-01093. 
C-15/00, Commission v. EIB of 10 July 2003, ECLI:EU:C:2003:396 I-07281. CJEU, joined cases: 
C-415/05 P, Kadi & Al Barakaat Int’l Foundation v. Council of 8 November 2008, ECLI:EU:C:2008:461, 
I-6351. For details see, R. UERPMANN-WITTZACK, Rechtsfragen und Rechtsfolgendes Beitritts der 
Europäischen Union zur EMRK, in Europarecht, 2012, pp. 167ss. C. NOWAK, Europarecht nach 
Lissabon, ed. Nomos, Baden-Baden, 2011. D. CHALMERS, G. DAVIES, G. MONTI, EU law, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 2014. J. TILLOTSON, N. FOSTER, Text, cases and materials on EU law, 
Gavedish Publishing, New York, 2013. M. HORSPOOL, M. HUMPHREYS, EU law, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 2012, pp. 552ss. SATZGER, International and European criminal law, Hart Publish-
ing, Oxford & Oregon, Portland, 2017. T. OPPERMANN, C.D. CLASSEN, M. NETTESHEIM, Europa-
recht, C.H. Beck, München, 2016.
7 par. 114. From this it follows that, if we accept the theory of control, that if the Member States does 
not respect the obligations imposed by the Union, the latter can be held responsible.In the sape 
spirit of orientation see the case: C-48/71, Commission of the European Communities v. Italy of 13 
July 1972, ECLI:EU:C:1972:65, not published.8 “la cour a progressivement situè son système d’interpretation dans un contexte normatif et institu-
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applying to it and its legal system some notions of domestic law (MERTENS DE 
WILMARS, 1985)9, especially the constitutional one10.
Since the early years of its operation, the quality and of some of its judges 
and advocates general have contributed to the progressive definition of CJEU’s 
interpretative strategy11. As was also noted: 
(...) all ECJ judges came from civil law countries and thus may have been 
predisposed toward the french approach. Be that as it may, by using the 
deductive conclusory french style, ECJ was able to communicate to mem-
ber states that the treaties they had entered into compelled the “constitu-
tional” results reached by the court (...) (ROSENFELD, 2006, p. 642). 
This is even more true considering that while CJEU expresses its opinions 
through jurisprudence at the same time its members often intervene in the sci-
entific debate related and consequent to it12. From this point of view, the opinions 
expressed by its members reinforce the persuasive relevance recognized to the 
doctrine that especially in the first years of activity of CJERU, it has reconstructed 
the interpretative approach and directed action13.
The interpretative strategy developed by it takes into account the sui generis 
character of EU system and its right by adopting interpretative choices functional 
to the development of the integration process as a fundamental objective of the 
treaty. The reference to the law was understood by CJEU in a very broad sense 
not limiting itself to the letter of treaties or secondary law but considering EU as 
an autonomous legal order with the consequence of referring to the object and 
purpose of the treaties, also to fill the gaps (POLLICINO, 2004)14. Since their aims 
tionnel de nature constitutionnelle” (MERTENS DE WILMARS, 1985. p. 8).9 “le droit communataire est le droit interne des Communautès europèennes (...) qu’il prèsente pas 
pour autant les mêmes caractèristiques qu’un droit interne national (...)” (MERTENS DE WILMARS, 
1985. p. 8).10 “(...) the court in the context of the specificity of the legal ordering process whose law acquires 
the constitutional validity (in a material sense) of the legal system whose law acquires effectiveness 
because it is legitimized by the respect of the rules attributing jurisdiction and reinforced by a set of 
founding elements and values or structural that it itself reconstructs (...)” (POIARES MADURO, 2007).11 “(...) ce qui ressemble à de l’hèroïsme exerce une attraction puissance sur un certain type de tem-
pèrament parmi les juges et peut fournir à la cour une excuse à son dèsir d’adopter une attitude 
spectaculaire spècialement si le coût semble aussi minime (...)” (HAMSON, 1976, p. 20-). See also: 
RASMUSSEN, H. On law and policy in the European Court of Justice. Dordrecht: Springer, 1986.12 “(...) many worked for one of the community institutions (...) and shared the spirit of edcitement 
geenrated by the new venture (...)” (ARNULL, 2013, p. 212).
13 “(...) the authors of much of the early literature on community law did indeed seem to see their 
main task as being merely to explain the new system to the uninitiated (...)” (ARNULL, 2013, p. 212-).
14 “(...) it is precisely in connection with such silences or insufficiencies that we see appearing for 
the first time the desire of the court (...) to free itself form the straight-jacket of the jurisdictional 
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are generic and oriented towards progressive integration, CJEU has been able to 
use an interpretative strategy aimed at this15.
2. EU’s law interpretation methods 
In CJEU jurisprudence we find according to the most famous classifica-
tion the following interpretative methods: literal, historical, comparative, sys-
tematic and teleological (MERTENS DE WILMARS , 1985; KUTSCHER, 1978; 
ALBORS LLORENS, 1999; BROBERG; FENGER, 2014). Under a different visual 
angle, considering the effects following from the application of different inter-
pretative methods, they could be traced back to the macro-division between 
static and dynamic or evolutionary interpretation methods (BENGOETXEA, 
1993; DUMON, 1978).
Literal interpretation according to which the terms of a provi-
sion are interpreted in their usual meaning, even if used16, may pres-
ent some drawbacks (WIJCKERHELD, 1965)17: sometimes it leads to 
absurd results, because contrary to the object of the discipline (MERTENS 
DE WILMARS , 1985); moreover, even the simplest term can have mar-
gins of ambiguity and therefore makes its interpretation necessary. 
There is also the issue of multilingualism to be considered (DICKSHAT, 1968; VAN 
CALSTER, 1997; SHARPSTON, 2009-2010; LIPSTEIN, 1974-1975; PAUNIO, 2016; 
DICKSON; ELEFTHERIADIS, 2012; FOLLESDAL et al, 2018), where the different 
versions of treaties and derived law are equally authentic (article 55, paragraph 
1 TEU) and it is necessary to find an interpretation capable of overcoming this 
obstacle (MERTENS DE WILMARS, 1985).
powers conferred upon it (...)” (CHEVALLEIR, 1965, p. 25). “(...) in doing so, the ECJ is in a similar 
position to a law-making constitutional court (...)” (CONSTANTINESCO, 2000, p. 76). See also: TRI-
DIMAS, T. The Court of justice and judicial activism. European Law Review, n. 2, 1996, p. 206-.
15 “(...) particulièrement approprièe aux caractèristiques propres des traitès instituant le 
commmunautès (...)” (PESCATORE, 19--, p. 328). See also: LIPSTEIN, K. Some practical comparative 
law: the interpretation of multi-lingual with special regard to the EEC treaties. Tulane Law Review, 
1974, p. 910-.
16CJEU, C-10/61, Commission v. Italy of 27 February 1962, ECLI:EU:C:1962:2 I-00001. C-43/69, 
B.A. Bilger of 18 March 1970, ECLI:EU:C:1970:20 I-00127. C-57/72, Westzucher GmbH v. Einfur-un 
Vorratstelle für Zucker of 14 March 1973, ECLI:EU:C:1973:20 I-00321. C-149/73, Witt v. Haupt-
zollamt Hamburg-Ericus of 12 December 1973, ECLI:EU:C:1973:160 I-01587. C-19/81, Burton 
v. British Railways Board of 16 February 1982, ECLI:EU:C:1982:58, I-00554, par. 9. C-152/84, 
Marshall v. Southampton and South-West Hampshire Area Health Authority of 26 February 
1986, ECLI:EU:C:1986:84, I-00723, par. 35. C-91/92, Faccini Dori v. Recreb Srl of 14 July 1994, 
ECLI:EU:C:1994:292, I-03325, par. 14. 
17 “(...) lorsque la norme en question est claire exclut la nècessitè d s’en rèfèrer au contexte (...)” 
(MONACO, 1965, p. 178-).
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Finally, there is the question of the generic nature of some EU provisions, 
especially those of the founding treaties, which need to be interpreted (ALBORS 
LLORENS, 1999). The literal method as the main interpretative method was 
employed by CJEU in the very first years of its operation even if almost imme-
diately it was flanked by other methods because as observed in the doctrine, 
in interpreting EU law it must be recognized that the letter of the text it does 
not exhaust all the interpretation but serves only as a base (MERTENS DE 
WILMARS, 1985)18.
The historical method has two variants, both little used by CJEU for the pur-
poses of interpreting EU law. The first enhances legislator’s intention by inter-
preting the rule according to the objective will expressed by its authors, but in EU 
law the use of preparatory works that do not exist for the original founding trea-
ties is of little use, while they have sometimes been used for subsequent ones and 
for secondary law19. The second variant considers the function that the provision 
to be interpreted had at the time it was approved. Also unlike the interpretation 
in a historical-evolutionary sense20 to which CJEU referred in C-283/81, CILFIT 
sentence of 6 October 198221 does not appear useful for the purposes of EU law 
18 “(...) even if the wording used seems to be cliar, it is still necessary to refer to the spirit, general 
scheme, and cotnext of the provision (...)” (BENGOETXEA, 1995).19 Mertens de Wilmar (1985, p. 15) which is declared that: «(...) la cour n’a aucune espèce de 
prèvention contre cette mèthode d’interprètation (...)». CJEU, C-336/03, easyCar of 10 March 
2005, ECLI:EU:C:2005:105, I-01947, par. 20. C-62/14, Gauweiler and others of 16 June 2015, 
ECLI:EU:C:2015:400, published in the electronic Reports of the cases, par. 100, and is referred in 
the treaty of Maastricht. In the same orientation see: C-292/89, Antonissen of 26 February 1991, 
ECLI:EU:C:1991:80, I-00745. joined cases C-283, 291 and 292/94, Denkavit of 17 October 1996, 
ECLI:EU:C:1996:387, I-05063, par. 29, in which the CJEU does not, for the purposes of legal cer-
tainty, emphasize whether they have been included in the EU law. See for further details and analy-
sis: SCHØNBERG, S.; FRICK, F. Finishing, refining, polishing. On the use of travaux preparatoires as 
an aid to the interpretation of community legislation. European Law Review, 2003. Also, for more 
details: LENAERTS, K.; GUTIÉRREZ-FONS, J. A. To say what the law of the EU is: methods of interpre-
tation and the European Court of Justice, EUI working paper, 2013.20CJEU, C-58/17, INEOS of 18 January 2018, ECLI:EU:C:2018:19. C-540/16, Spika and others of 
12 July 2016, ECLI:EU:C:2016:565. C-291/16, Scheppers of 9 March 2017, ECLI:EU:C:3017:950. 
C-398/15, Manni of 9 March 2017, ECLI:EU:C:2017:197. C-534/13, Fipa Groupad and others of 4 
March 2015, ECLI:EU:C:2015:140, all the cited cases was published in the electronic Reports of the 
cases.21As was envisaged by the interpretative pronouncement of the Cilfit judgment (C-283/81, Srl CIL-
FIT and Lanificio di Gavardo SpA v. Ministry of Health of 06 October 1981, ECLI:EU:C:1981:335, 
I-03415) where the CJEU has stated “(...) any provision of Community law must be relied on its own 
context and interpreted in the light of all the provisions of that right, its aims and its evolution stage 
at the time when the application of the provision in question is adopted (…) of the terms of a provi-
sion of European Union law which does not contain any express reference to the law of the Member 
States for the purpose of determining its meaning and its scope must normally be an autonomous 
and uniform interpretation throughout the European Union,taking into account the context of the 
provision and the purpose pursued by the legislation in question (...)”. See in argument: (AZOULAI, 
2010; BECK, 2012; LENAERTS; GUTIÉRREZ-FONS, 2013; LÜTTRINGHAUS, 2013).
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interpretation, considered which is governed by a legal order which by its nature 
has a dynamic character (ALBORS LLORENS, 1999; KUTSCHER, 1976).
With regard to the comparative method22, CJEU has resorted more to it in the 
conclusions of the Advocate General and in the processing phase of sentences, 
than of the text of the same (PESCATORE, 1980; LENAERTS, 2003; ALMEIDA, 
2014; LENAERTS; GUTMAN, 2016; ANDENAS; FAIRGRIEVE, 2015; MOORHEAD, 
2014; DERLÉN; LINDHOLM, 2018) also because, as has been acutely observed, 
this method is opposed to the idea itself of autonomy of EU legal system that also 
includes autonomy of its concepts and its technical language23.
The systematic method (also called contextual) according to which the rule 
must be interpreted by referring to other EU regulations or even more extended 
to the order of its whole is frequently used by CJEU24 as well as the teleologi-
cal method that states that interpret a provision in light of the aims pursued by 
the order to which it belongs25 in its jurisprudence CJEU refers to one or more 
methods of interpretation among those just mentioned, depending on the norm 
and question that are from time to time the subject of its judgment (MONACO, 
1965) while the cases in which CJEU has stated in general terms and principle 
its own criteria of interpretation or its own interpretative strategy, preferring to 
highlight the result rather than the path that produced it26.
A sentence in which CJEU presented its interpretative strategy is the well-
known and already mentioned CILFIT sentence of 1982 in which, after having 
22 CJEU, C-421/14, Banco Primus of 26 January 2017, ECLI:EU:C:2017:60, published in the elec-
tronic Reports of the cases.
23 Bengoetxea (2016, 1993, p. 216) has affirmed that: “(...) it does not seem possible to demonstrate 
the existence of a principle or a norm that are not explicitly foreseen by the Treaty of Union in 
virtue of which the practice of an organ would have efficiency modification or relevance of authen-
tic interpretation towards of all the Member States (...) the situation is clearly different and the 
juridical reconstruction of the phenomenon must be a completely different one where a formal 
jurisdiction of interpretation is attributed to not determined organ of an international organiza-
tion... view of the Vienna Convention it seems clear that the cases of this gender are covered by the 
reservation of any rule relevant to the organization (art. 5 of the Convention) (...)”. In jurisprudence 
see: CJEU, C-30/59, De Gezamenlijke Steenkolenmijnen of 23 February 1961, ECLI:EU:C:1961:2 
I-00001. C-188/00, Kurz of 19 November 2002, ECLI:EU:C:2002:694, I-10691. joined cases C-187 
to 190/05, Agorastoudis of 7 September 2006, ECLI:EU:C:2006:535, I-07775, par. 28. For frurhs 
analysis see: (KACZOROWSKA-IRELAND, 2016; CARBELLI, 2014; SÁNCHEZ GRAELLS, 2015).
24 CJEU, C-14/59, Sociètè des fonderies de Pont-à-Mousson of 17 December 1959, ECLI.
EU:C.1959:31, I-00215. C-15/60, Simon of 1st June 1961, ECLI:EU:C:1961:11 I-00220.
25 CJEU, C-8/55, Fèdèration Charbonnière de Belgique v. High Athority of 16 July 1956, 
ECLI:EU:C:1956:7 I-00245. C-8/57, Groupement des hauts fourneaux et acièries belges of 21 June 
1958, ECLI:EU:C:1958:9, I-00225. For further details see: (SCHEINGOLD, 2013; MANN, 2013).
26 “(...) it focuses attention on outcomes, rather than process (...)” (CONWAY, 2012, p. 26). In argu-
ment see also: (SHAW, 2018; HORSLEY, 2018).
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enunciated the theory of the clear act, it focused on the particular difficulties 
presented by EU law interpretation: multilingualism, the autonomy of its terms 
compared to the identical ones present in the various national rights; the fact 
that every provision of EU law (literal interpretation) must be relocated in its 
own context and interpreted in the light of all the provisions of the aforemen-
tioned law (systematic interpretation)27, of its aims (teleological interpretation) 28 as well as its stage of evolution to moment in which the provision in question 
must be applied. In the slightly later C-292/82, Merck sentence of 17 November 
1983 states that: “(...) as the court has emphasized in its jurisprudence for the 
purposes of interpreting a rule of EU law it must be taken account not only of 
the letter of the same but also of its context and the aims pursued by the legisla-
tion of which it is part (...)” (CJEU, 1999). Over time, a concise formula has been 
consolidated in CJEU jurisprudence according to which the interpretation of EU 
provision takes into account at the same time the letter, context and its purpose 
(...)29, to the point that for take up the words of Fennelly: 
(...) the court now repeats in a stereotypical form that for the purpose 
of interpreting a rule of EU law one must take into account not only its 
letter but also its context and aims pursued from the legislation of which 
it is part (...) the refrain has become a customary repetition of a formula 
that flattens all the sources into a single interpretative perspective (...) 
(FENNELLY, 1997, p. 664)30.
27 CJEU, C-415/17, Mniero of 11 September 2018, ECLI:EU:C:2018:912. C-89/17, Banger of 12 July 
2018, ECLI:EU:C:2018:570. C-647/16, Hassan of 31 May 2018, ECLI:EU:C:2018:368. C-165/16, 
Lounes of 14 November 2017, ECLI:EU:C:2017:862. C-617/15, Hummel Holding of 18 May 2017, 
ECLI:EU:C:2017:390. C-19/15, Veband sozialer Wettbeverb of 14 July 2016, ECLI:EU:C:2016:563. 
C-276/14, Gmina Wroclaw of 29 September 2015, ECLI:EU:C:2015:635, all the cited cases was pub-
lished in the electronic Reports of the cases.28 CJEU, C-292/83, Merck v. Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Jonas of 15 December 1999, ECLI:EU:C:1999:326, 
I-03663.29 CJEU, C-162/91, Tenutl Bosco of 15 October 1992, ECLI:EU:C:1992:392, I-05279. C-83/94, Le-
ifer and others of 17 October 1995, ECLI:EU:C:1995:329, I-03231, par. 22. C-301/98, KVS Interna-
tional of 18 May 2000, ECLI:EU:C:2000:269, I-03583, par. 21. C-315/00, Maierhofer of 16 January 
2003, ECLI:EU:C:2003:23 I-00563, par. 27. C-321/02, Harbs of 15 July 2004, ECLI:EU:C:2004:447, 
I-07101, par. 24. C-298/07, Bundesverband der Verbraucherzentralen und Verbraucherver-
bände of 16 October 2008, ECLI:EU:C:2008:572, I-07841, par. 15. C-403/09 PPU, Detiček of 23 
December 2009, ECLI:EU:C.2009:810, I-12193, par. 33. C-433/08, Yaesu Europe of 3 December 
2009, ECLI:EU:C:2009:750, I-11487, par. 24. C-533/08, TNT Express Nederland of 4 May 2010, 
ECLI:EU:C:2010:243, I-04107, par. 44. C-112/11, ebookers.com Deutschland of 19 July 2012, 
ECLI:EU:C:2012:487, published in the electronic Reports of the cases, par. 12. C-219/11, Brain 
Products of 22 November 2012, ECLI:EU:C:2012:742, published in the electronic Reports of the 
cases, par. 13. For further details and analysis see: (EDWARD, 2013; ACOSTA ARCARAZO; MURPHY, 
2014; PEERS, 2016).
30 The standard of teleological method “(...) to consider not only its wording, but also the context 
in which it occurs and the objects of the rules of which it is a part (...)” (FENNELLY, 1997, p. 664).
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The three methods most used are the literal, systematic and teleological with 
the last two being frequently considered together31, giving life to what Kolb defines 
an extended teleological method, since it does not refer to a specific arrangement, 
but uses a whole treaty (KOLB, 2006). Furthermore, as reported by Arnull, the tele-
ological and systematic approach “(...) is more frequently employed with the court 
is with questions of a constitutional nature (...)” (ARNULL, 2013, p. 621).
The three methods in question are not on the same level. The frequency 
with which CJEU uses it in its jurisprudence as well as the importance attributed 
to them allow the identification of the interpretative strategy developed and fol-
lowed by it within which there is a solid prevalence for teleological and system-
atic interpretation (KUTSCHER, 1946; MONACO, 1965)32. On some occasions, as 
in C-14/81, Alpha Steel sentence of 3 March 198133, CJEU rejected one of the argu-
ments advanced by the applicant, stating that admitting it would have meant not 
interpreting, but modifying a clear and unambiguous text34. And in other cases it 
was CJEU itself, recalling reasons of certainty of the right not to accept teleologi-
cal and extensive interpretations in some of its pronunciations35. On other occa-
sions, CJEU has not taken into account the clear literal data of the provision that 
was called to evaluate and made the teleological interpretation prevail over the 
literal36, using for this purpose also the systematic method and transforming EU 
objectives into principles of interpretation of the treaties (SOREL, 2011)37.
31 “(...) the teleological and contextual method (...)” (BENGOETXEA, 1993, p. 250). “(...) the teleo-
logical and contextual approaches (...)” (POIARES MADURO, 2007, p. 140; KUTSCHER, 1976; AR-
NULL, 2013). 
32 Bredimas (1978, p. 80) has declared that: “(...) the functonal method (...) is the method for in-
terpretation of community law (...)”. Mertens de Wilmars (1985, p. 16) affirmed that: “(...) la place 
reconnue à l’interpètation systèmatique at tèlèologique correspond donc à la fois aux particularitès 
lègistiques des traitès et au caractère dynamique et finalisè de la construction communautaire (...)”.
33 CJEU, C-14/81, Alpha Steel Ltd v. Commission of the European Communities of 3 March 1982, 
ECLI:EU:C:1982:76, I-00749.
34 CJEU, C-14/81, Alpha Steel Ltd v. Commission of the European Communities of 3 March 1982, 
op. cit., par. 32
35 CJEU, C-506/06, Glaxosmithkline services and others v. Commission and others of 6 October 
2009, ECLI:EU:C:2009:610, I-09291. C-528/08 P, Marcuccio v. Commission of 9 December 2009, 
ECLI:EU:C:2009:761, I-00212, according the CJEU refers to previous judgments such as the case: 
C-48/07, Les Vergers du Vieux Tauves of 22 December 2008, ECLI:EU:C:2008:758, I-10627, par. 
44., which is affirmed that: “(...) we cannot proceed by ignoring the clear and precise formulation of 
a provision (of a directive) to an interpretation aimed at correcting that provision while expanding 
the obligations of Member States to it relative (...)”.
36 In jurisprudence see: CJEU, C-36/74, Walrave of 12 December 1974, ECLI:EU:C:1974:140, 
I-01405, parr. 23-25. C-43/75, Defrenne of 8 April 1976, ECLI:EU:C:1976:56, I-00455, par. 27. 
C-314/85, Foto-Frost of 22 October 1987, ECLI:EU:C:1987:452, I-04199, par. 17. For further details 
see: (EXNER, 2019).
37 “(...) it thus appears that the ECJ has turned the objectives of community treaties into real prin-
ciples of interpretation for those treaties (...)” (FITZMAURICE; MERKOURIS, 2010; NOUTE, 2013; 
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Ultimately, while sharing the assertion that the interpretation is a child of 
the system to which it refers, it must be acknowledged that with reference to 
EU law the text (literal method)38 must be considered in its context (systematic 
method) and analyzed with reference to the purposes of the system to which it 
BJORGE, 2014; CORTEN; KLEIN, 2011; DÖRR, 2012; SAMSO, 2011; SOREL; BORÉ EVENO, 2011; 
GARDINER, 2008; NOUTE, 2013). «(...) cette mèthode a permis une èvolution au-delà de la signifi-
cation littèrale des textes dans un sens dunamique en considèration des finalitès poursuivies par le 
traitè dans son ensemble et de son contexte (...)» (SCHOCKWEILER, 1995, p. 74) (ARNULL, 1998).
38 CJEU, C-393/18 PPU, VD of 17 October 2018, ECLI:EU:C:2018:835. C-149/18, Da Silva Martins of 
31 January 2019, ECLI:EU:C:2019:84. C-514/17, Sut of 13 December 2018, ECLI:EU:C:2018:1016, 
C-493/17, Weiss and others of 11 December 2018, ECLI:EU:C:2018:1000. C-349/17, Eesti Pagar of 5 
March 2019, ECLI:EU:C:2019:172. C-332/17, Starman of 13 September 2018, ECLI.EU:C:2018:721. 
C-229/17, Evonik Degussa of 17 May 2018, ECLI:EU:C:2018:323. C-220/17, Planta Tavak of 31 Janu-
ary of 2019, ECLI:EU:C:2019:76. C-127/17, Vossalph Laeis of 24 October 2018, ECLI:EU:C:2018:855. 
C-122/17, Smith of 7 August 2018, ECLI:EU:C:2018:631. C-105/17, Kamaenova of 4 October 2018, 
ECLI:EU:C:2018:808. C-51/17, OTP Bank of 20 September 2018, ECLI:EU:C:2018:750. C-49/17, 
Koppers Denmark of 6 June 2018, ECLI:EU:C:2018:395. C-31/17, Cristal Union of 7 March 2018, 
ECLI:EU:C:2018:168. C-20/17, Oberle of 21 June 2018, ECLI:EU:C:2018:485. C-506/16, Neto 
de Sousa of 7 Septemebr 2017, ECLI:EU:C:2017:642. C-439/16 PPU, Milev of 27 October 2016, 
ECLI:EU:C:2016:818. C-395/16, DOCERAM of 8 March 2018, ECLI:EU:C:2018:172. C-256/16, 
Deichmann of 15 March 2018, ECLI:EU:C:2018:187. C-201/16, Shiri of 25 October 2017, 
ECLI:EU:C:2017:805. C-76/16, INGSTEEL and Metrostav of 8 February 2017, ECLI:EU:C:2017:549. 
C-678/15, Khorassani of 8 February 2017, ECLI:EU:C:2017:100. C-600/15, Lemins Lighting of 
8 December 2016, ECLI:EU:C:2016:937. C-529/15, Folk of 10 January 2017, ECLI:EU:C:2017:1. 
C-441/15, Madaus of 9 February 2017, ECLI:EU:C:2017:103. C-233/15, Oniors Bio of 28 April 2016, 
ECLI:EU:C:2016:305. C-141/15, Doux of 9 March 2017, ECLI:EU:C:2017:188. C-84/15, Sonos Europe 
of 17 March 2016, ECLI:EU:C:2016:184. C-44/15, Duval of 26 November 2015, ECLI:EU:C:2015:783. 
C-558/14, Khachab o 21 April 2016, ECLI:EU:C:2016:285. C-494/14, Axa Belgium of 15 October 
2015, ECLI:EU:C.2015:692. C-477/14, Pillbox 38 of 4 May 2016, ECLI:EU:C:2016: 324. C-408/14, 
Wojciechowski of 10 September 2015, ECLI:EU:C:2015:591. C-402/14, Viamar of 17 December 
2015, ECLI:EU:C:2015:625. C-387/14, Esaprojekt of 4 May 2017, ECLI:EU:C:2017:338. C-371/14, 
APEX of 17 December 2015, ECLI:EU:C:2015:828. C-331/14, Trgovina Prizma of 9 July 2015, 
ECLI:EU:C:2015:456. C-297/14, Hobohum of 23 December 2015, ECLI:EU:C:2015:844. C-241/142, 
Bukovansky of 19 November 2015, ECLI:EU:C:2015:766. C-216/14, Covaci of 15 October 2015, 
ECLI:EU:C:2015:686. C-655/13, Metens of 5 February 2015, ECLI.EU.C.2015:62. C-628/13, Lafonta 
of 11 March 2015, ECLI:EU:C:2015:16. C-570/13, Gruber of 16 April 2015, ECLI:EU:C:2015:231. 
C-482/13, Unicaja Banco of 21 January 2015, ECLI:EU:C:2015:21. C-481/13, Quarbani of 17 July 
2014, ECLI.EU:C:2014:2101, all the cited cases was published in the electronic Reports of the cases. 
From the judgments just quoted we can conclude that the CJEU presents itself as a judge of rec-
ognition of the autonomy of the Union order which presupposes and fosters mutual trust in that 
transfer of legality which according to a neo-functional understanding of the Union is in itself a 
factor of integration. The process is not automatic but requires the conscious assumption of an 
ethical-political responsibility on the part of the judges who effectively construct the establish-
ment of a Union legal order as a sign and expression of a new historical solidarity complementary 
to national solidarity. CJEU decisions must be solicited by national judgments. Their duty is serious 
if judges of last resort to uphold the execution of the law of the Union as a juridical obligation that 
involves every sentence without doubts as the effect of the moral authority that the judge of the 
Union has quickly acquired and which has not ceased to acquire. This is a matter of trust that the 
community institutions must inspire for their own functioning. The CJEU must be a moral authority 
that inspires confidence even before requesting the fulfillment and execution of its own decisions, 
the CJEU calls for recognition of its institutional role just as the Community doctrine requires ad-
herence to the federalist project and the prospect of integration legal.
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belongs (teleological method) which brings out a hierarchy among the interpre-
tative methods used by CJEU.
3. The reasons for the prevalence of teleological 
interpretation in the first decades of european integration
CJEU has developed a resolutely teleological jurisprudence that tends to 
emancipate itself from the intentions of the editors (CORTEN, 2011) and through 
which it carries out as acutely pointed out in doctrine, the role of guardian and 
at the same time promoter of the European order39. In this regard, the opinion 
according to which the teleological interpretation method would not in any case 
favor the increase EU competences but could also limit the application of EU law 
(LENAERTS; GUTIÉRREZ-FONS, 2013)40 does not appear to be founded.
The reason for the prevalence of the aforementioned method, especially in 
the early decades of European integration lies in the fact that the institutional 
treaties were intrinsically suited to teleology41, as they were structured around 
functional lines, which left spaces that political institutions and CJEU were called 
to fill in (LENAERTS, 2007)42. It is a method that can be defined as teleological 
only in a very particular sense qualified first of all by the fact that in addition to 
the purpose of each rule considered in itself and in the specific context in which it 
is placed, it pays attention to the purpose of the entire system (hence the combi-
nation of teleological and systematic method) and taking into account the struc-
tural data that individuals and companies are subjects of EU order and that in the 
latter operate fundamental principles.
The choice of the court of Luxembourg to privilege the teleological interpre-
tative method often in combination with the systematic one is due to the evident 
will especially in the first three decades of its jurisprudence to affirm the impor-
tance and autonomy of EU order as a system (MERTENS DE WILMARS, 1985; 
SCHOCKWEILER, 1995) thus overcoming its sectoriality43 and consolidating the 
harmonization of its rules.
39 “(...) convient le mieux au dynamisme de l’intègration europèenne (...)” (WIJCKERHELD, 1965, p. 192).
40 See also the case: C-189/87, Kalfelis of 27 September 1988, ECLI:EU:C:1988:459, I-05565.
41 “(...) the treaties are imbued by teleology. No persuasive argument has so far been made why, in exer-
cising its interpretative function, it would not be legitimate for he court to seek guidance from the spirit 
and the scheme of the treaties and to seek for further integration (...)” (TRIDIMAS, 1996, p. 205).
42 “(...) les traitès instituant les communautès sont entièrement pètris de tèlèologie (...) derrière cet 
objectif cocnret d’ordre èconomique, financier et techniques se profile una finalitè plus lontaine, celle 
de l’unitè politique (...)” (PESCATORE, 19--, p. 327).
43 The low degree of systematicity that a sectoral order presents and forces the judge to reconstruct 
his principles and general characteristics by deriving them in part from the objectives to which the 
order in question and general characteristics derive, partly deriving from the comparison with other 
orders (comparative method) partly still from the logical foundations of law (systematic method).
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In the early years CJEU used this interpretative approach in order to build 
the community legal order and to assert the prevalence (BECK, 2016), favoring 
the transformation of an international organization into a community of law 
(FENNELLY, 1997; SCHOCKWEILER, 1995).
CJEU has used the teleological method on numerous occasions for example 
in order to overcome member states resistence44, to fill gaps with C-101/63, 
Wagner sentence of 12 May 196445 where it states that the treated kings must 
also be interpreted jointly whether the Treaty of European Coal and Steel 
Community (ECSC) did not contain, unlike the other two rules of ritual for refer-
ral to the Court to prevent state violations of EU law obligations46 or to promote 
and protect EU legal order as in the very well-known judgments van Gend & Loos 
of 196347, Costa v. ENEL of 196448 and Foto-Frost of 198749. Coming to the conclu-
sion that by emphasizing the aims pursued by the law the teleological method 
could not be limited to making explicit a legal norm implicit in a text. The teleo-
44 CJEU, C-43/75, Defrenne of 8 April 1976, op. cit., parr. 7-15, “(...) the question of the direct effec-
tiveness of Article 119 must be examined in the light of the nature of the principle of equal pay for 
the aim pursued by that provision and its placement in the system of the treaty. a double purpose 
(...) from this double economic and social purpose derives that the principle of equal distribution 
is one of the fundamental principles of the community. This consideration explains why the treaty 
wanted this principle to be entirely applied sn from the first stage of the transitional period. In 
interpreting this provision, no argument can be drawn from the delay and resistance which the 
effective application of the said essential principle (...) has delayed in certain Member States (...)”.
45 CJEU, C-101/63, Wagner v. Fohrmann and others of 12 May 1964, ECLI:EU:C:1964:28, I-00381.
46 CJEU, joined cases C-6 and 9/90 Francovich of 19 November 1991, ECLI:EU:C:1991:428, I-05357, 
par. 37: “(...) Community law imposes the principle according to which the member states are 
obliged to compensate the damage caused to individuals by violations of Community law attrib-
utable to them (...)”. See also in argument: STRAND, M. The pressing on problem in damages and 
restitution under EU law, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishers, 2017.
47 In this sentence the CJEU affirmed that: “(...) according to the spirit, the structure and the tenor 
of the treaty, art. 12 (in the matter of customs union) has a preceptive value and attributes to the 
individuals objective rights which the national judges are required to protect (...)”.
48 According to the court: “(...) the integration into the law of each member state of laws emanating 
from community sources, and more generally the spirit and terms of the treaty have as a corollary 
the impossibility for states to give precedence against a legal order from they accepted on condi-
tion of reciprocity, a further unilateral provision which therefore could not be opposed to the com-
mon order. If the effectiveness of the Community law varied from one State to another according to 
the later internal laws this would endanger the implementation of the aims of the treaty (...) from 
the set of the aforementioned elements it follows that arising from an autonomous source, the right 
born of the treaty would not be able precisely to find a limit in any internal provision without los-
ing the priority community and precisely without the juridical foundation of the community itself 
being shaken (...)”.
49 The court speaks of “(...) necessary coherence of the jurisdictional protection system established 
by the treaty” (par. 16) which makes that the judges cannot declare invalid the EU law acts, since 
the existence of divergences between the Judges of the Member States on the validity of Commu-
nity acts could compromise the very unity of the Community legal order and undermine the formal 
need for legal certainty (...) “, paragraph 15.
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logical method also makes it possible to state explicitly a juridical norm which 
is sunk in the system and which is capable of satisfying the aims pursued by dif-
ferent provisions. The use of such a method is all the more justified in EU law 
(POIARES MADURO, 2007)50.
CJEU pursues the objective of advancing the integration process that per-
meates an order with an essentially finalistic character (PESCATORE, 19--), of 
which the judicial institution itself constitutes a fundamental piece (GUTIÉRREZ 
POSSE, 1972). When the interpretation is entrusted to CJEU its interpretation 
gives a role also in the development of this right51. The statement according to 
our opinion, which was the consistent exercise of its mission by EU judge, is fully 
understandable. CJEU is not an observer to that process but operates within it 
and the legal-institutional system that supports it.
The use of an evolutionary and dynamic interpretative strategy by CJEU is a 
further confirmation of the approach followed by the international judicial bod-
ies called to interpret treaties establishing international organizations, whose 
jurisprudential practice is generally oriented to reach the object and the purpose 
provided for them (KOLB, 2006)52. In this regard it should be noted that just as 
European treaties are not entirely similar to other international treaties, includ-
ing those establishing international organizations, EU is only partly attributable 
to the ordinary model of international organization, not even CJEU can be con-
sidered as a simple international court (BEHR, 1958-1959). The amount of its 
jurisprudence is far greater than that of international courts with the sole excep-
tion perhaps of the European Court of Human Rights. And in terms of quality, 
Luxembourg court depending on circumstances and cases submitted to it, per-
forms functions similar to those of an administrative, civil, constitutional, inter-
national labor court, etc (BEHR, 1958-1959; EDWARD, 1996-1997; KOOPMANS, 
2000; KUTSCHER, 1976). And in its operation it has traits reminiscent of a civil 
law court, others that seem closer to a common law judge (ROSENFELD, 2006; 
LENAERTS, 2013; CONSTANTINESCO, 2000).
With specific reference to the subject, the difference in the interpretation of 
a treaty establishing an international organization and that of a supranational (or 
integration) organization that also has the character of establishing the organiza-
50 “(...) the teleological method of interpretation is perfectly consistent with the dynamic and evol-
ving nature of the european community (...)” (POLLICINO, 2004, p. 289). contra: BECK, 2016.
51 “(...) the seemingly stable and entrenched nature of effectiveness can compensate or camouflage 
the novelty of the development which it is no reason why effectiveness should always operate to 
enlarge the reach or penetration of EC intervention (...)” (ROSS, 2006, p. 482).
52 «(...) ètant une juridiction supranationale (...) prèfère l’interprètation extensive (...) ce qui n’est 
pas permis aux juridictions internationales normales (...)» (DEGAN, 1963, p. 212).
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tion (KUTSCHER, 1976)53 has long been highlighted. Treaties’ interpretation and 
of those instituting international organizations is of contracting states responsi-
bility and any divergences are resolved with the means provided for this purpose 
by international law, the contracting states of EU treaties that have intended to 
attribute exclusively to an EU institution the task of interpreting the treaties54.
According to a reconstruction based on the consolidated CJEU jurisprudence 
which affirmed the constitutional nature of the founding treaties55 the idea that 
CJEU should be considered as an internal jurisdiction56, rather than an interna-
tional one, is widely accepted (BECK, 2016). The position of those who recognize 
the autonomous character of CJEU with respect to both international and inter-
nal courts57 appears more balanced, and its role in EU goes beyond that of a state 
jurisdictional body and its jurisprudence has a special importance because as for 
recognized time the interpretation provided by EU judge succeeds in influencing 
directly and uniformly the decisions of member states organs, because directly 
and uniformly the binding value of EU order is recognized in the same area of 
those states.
CJEU’s teleological interpretative strategy has led to changes in the growth of EU 
competences and powers (FENNELLY, 1997; BENGOETXEA; MACCORMICK; MORAL 
SORIANO, 2001; TEMPLE LANG, 2011)58. It must be recognized that institutions and 
member states have on several occasions taken up evolutionary statements pres-
53 “(...) le droit communautaire est pour une part un droit interne (...)” (REUTER, 1964, p. 279).
54 “(...) si les Etats avaient voulu instituer simplement entre eux une large coopèration (...) ils 
pouvaient aisèment se passer des services d’une Cour de justice (...)”(REUTER, 1964, p. 280.
55CJEU, C-294/83, Les Verts of 23 April 1986, op. cit., par. 8. C-314/91, Weber v. European Parlia-
ment of 23 March 1993, op. cit.,
56 “(...) neither its status as a transnational court nor its operating in a treaty-based rather than 
a constitution-based environment seems to prevent any serious impedimenti to its functioning 
as a court that engages in constitutional adjudication (...)” (ROSENFELD, 2006, p. 622). “(...) cette 
cour ressemble à une juridicion constitutionnelle interne qui est appelèe seulement à interprèter la 
constitution d’un Etat (...)” (DEGAN, 1996, p. 198). “(...) in the community system the Court of jus-
tice fulfils among its general mission functions similar to those of national constitutional courts 
(...)” (EVERLING, 2000, p. 33). “(...) the treaty can essentially be considered the constitution of the 
European community in a substantive, functional sense (...)” (ALTER, 2009; DE VISSCHER, 1958, p. 
178; LENAERTS, 2007, p. 1018). “(...) the masterpiece of the European court has been the consti-
tutionalisation of the treaties (...)” (MANCINI, 1989, p. 597; BENGOETXEA; MACCORMICK; MORAL 
SORIANO, 2001, p. 65; POLLICINO, 2004, p. 284). “(...) the Court has turned itself into a constitu-
tional Court of the Union, which does not shy away from combining different Union norms to reach 
a preferred outcome (...)” (WESSEL, 2009, p. 142).
57“(...) la cour, vue dans sa juste perspective n’est ni un juge international. Ni un juge de droit interne 
(...)” (MONACO, 1965, p. 181).
58 “(...) one explaination is a lack of awareness of the court’s role choice as regards among politi-
cians (...) never made a truly voluntary choice as regards the policy to be pursued (...)” (DE WAELE, 
2010, p. 17).
42 DIMITRIS LIAKOPOULOS
Revista DIREITO UFMS | Campo Grande, MS | v. 5 | n. 2 | p. 26 - 58 | jul./dez. 2019
ent in its jurisprudence and have used them in the context of amendments to the 
founding treaties or in order to broaden and intensify the process of European inte-
gration (STONE SWEET, 2016). If this had not happened it does not seem to us that 
the teleological CJEU jurisprudence could have on its own alone, to consolidate and 
reinforce this process59. On the other hand, not all the evolutionary affirmations of 
CJEU have found a follow-up in the European legislation demonstrating the non-
automatic transformation of the systematic and teleological interpretation of CJEU 
into European law norms. It is also undoubted that in the European legal system, if 
member states wanted to oppose an evolutionary teleological interpretation of CJEU 
they should in the most relevant cases for example in order to modify the European 
treaties, unanimously deliberate (HARTLEY, 1996; DE WAELE, 2010; BECK, 2016;)60.
It is a trivial observation that EU member states as a result of becoming 
a member of a voluntary choice limited their sovereignty in favor of the same 
union, giving it powers and competences. In fact, whenever a state concludes a 
supranational agreement, it limits, to a greater or lesser extent, its sovereignty, 
meaning to simplify the exercise of the power of government towards its own 
territorial community. Moreover, this limitation will last as long as the contrac-
tual obligation will be binding for the state that may eventually withdraw from a 
treaty following the occurrence of a cause for extinction thereof.
These observations seem to us to be confirmed also within EU whose exis-
tence derives from the will of member states expressed through international 
treaties, negotiated and stipulated and modified several times, in the case of 
decades. The fact that this is a very particular organization, because it is endowed 
with a very complex institutional apparatus, with extensive competences and can 
be very penetrating towards the member states and those who find themselves 
in them, does not seem sufficient for us to come minus the basic fate consisting 
in the fact that the Union still remains the fruit of choices made by the states that 
are part of it, who have decided to limit their sovereignty in favor of this, which 
preserves its root in the dimension international.
59 For example, consider what is the current Protocol n. 33 of European treaties relating to art. 157 
TFEU which was introduced with the treaty of Maastricht following the extensive interpretation of 
remuneration rendered by the CJEU with the sentence in case C-262/88, Barber Guardian Royal 
Exchange Assurance Group of 17 May 1990, ECLI:EU:C:1990:209, I-01889. See also in argument: 
DE CARVALHO MOITINHO DE ALMEIDA, J. C. L’interprètation par la Cour de justice de l’Union du 
droit europèen de procèdure civile. In: BRADLEY, K. et al. (Eds.). Of courts and constitutions. Liber 
amicorum in honour of Nial Fennelly. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014, p. 14-.
60 Stone Sweet (2010) has affirmed that: “(...) in the EU, the constitutionalization of the treaty of 
Rome was able to proceed, in part because the decision-rule in place for treaty-revision-the unani-
mous vote of the member States-effectively insulates the court’s constitutional law-making from 
reversal. In such contexts, dialogue exists, but it is the EC that typically has the “last word” not the 
member States (...)”.
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The pretoria origin, creative rectius interpretative EU law methods does not 
make it easy to identify, in an objective manner, the limits that CJEU meets in the 
exercise of its interpretative function61 so that some have criticized activism62 and 
qualified its approach as political rather than juridical (WEILER, 1987; CONWAY, 
2012)63, also considering that the same CJEU is required to comply with the prin-
ciple of loyalty principle established by TEU64.
Furthermore, it has been pointed out that the teleological method, linked as 
it is to the purpose to be pursued, is more difficult to use than the others and can 
lead to the danger of causing excessive distancing from the text. The reference to 
the aims may be too indeterminate and risks colliding with one of the fundamen-
tal principles of European law, that of legal certainty (NICOLAIDES; GEILMANN, 
2012), as well as that of attribution powers. In this regard, it was noted that in 
the presence of a clear and precise EU regulation, its teleological or systematic 
interpretation should not put it into question, because this would be contrary to 
legal certainty and the duty of sincere cooperation between the institutions65.
CJEU has not explicitly replied to these criticisms through its jurisprudence, 
but it is significant that on several occasions CJEU members themselves, through 
their publications, have diffused the work and interpretative strategy, emphasiz-
ing that if it is true that it has having made the political choices regarding the 
61 “(...) l’impatience de la cour peut être justifiès: mais elle ne devrait pas la conduire à alleur au-de-
là de ses compètences et à tenter d’ètablir de sa propre autoritè ce qui conformèment aux disposi-
tions du traitè devait être ètaibli par un processus tout à fair different (...)” (TOADER, 2013, p. 425).
62 “(...) reduced scholarly support of EU law-making (...) away, legal writing is critical of EU law-
making and judicial interpretation as comparable national legal scholarship and la doctrine, taken 
as a whole, is more reluctant to throw its weight behind plans for “more Europe” (...)” (MUIR; DAW-
SON; DE WITTE, 2013, p. 2). For further details see: DE WITTE, B. European union law: a unified 
academic discipline? In: VAUCHEZ, A.; DE WITTE, B. (eds.). Lawyering Europe: European law as a 
transnational social field. Oxford: Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013. 
63 “(...) paradoxically, the decision making of the CJEU is not subject than those of other courts. They 
are certain, however, not because its approach is governed by a high degree of methodological 
rigour, but because the court’s pro-union predisposition is so settled (...)” (BECK, 2016, p. 512) for 
the difference between legal interpretations and a judicial activism see: “(...) the former is consid-
ered a legitimate expression of judicial function and the latter its degeneration, involving a judge’s 
arbitrary intrusion into the political arena by giving priority to values other than legal ones (...)” 
(POLLICINO, 2004, p. 286).
64 “(...) the role of the ECJ is indeed neither to anticipate nor to pre-empt choices that fall within the 
purview of the EU legislator (...)” (LENAERTS; GUTIÉRREZ-FONS, 2013; LENAERTS, 2013, p. 1323), 
contra: “(...) the court of justice (...) will be aware that lake of judicial interference may very well 
mean that nothing will happen at all (...)” (KOOPMANS, 2000, p. 58).
65 According to the cited authors creative methods of interpretation are particularly unsuitable 
with reference to judicial cooperation in criminal matters. Another area in which there is little 
room for the application of the teleological method is that of technical, specific or detailed disci-
plinated regulations (LENAERTS; GUTIÉRREZ-FONS, 2013).
44 DIMITRIS LIAKOPOULOS
Revista DIREITO UFMS | Campo Grande, MS | v. 5 | n. 2 | p. 26 - 58 | jul./dez. 2019
aims and foundation of EU law66, its work has not diverged from what is generally 
done by the supreme internal jurisdictions and has in any case respected the com-
petences of the other institutions and member states political will (PESCATORE, 
1994; SCHOCKWEILER, 1995)67.
These criticisms derive from a selective approach in examining CJEU juris-
prudence which leads to generalizations on the way in which it interprets EU 
law, which do not take into account the fact that in most cases, CJEU follows a 
cautious interpretative approach (TRIDIMAS, 1996; ALBORS LLORENS, 1999)68. 
Although reasonable this position is not convincing since it is easy to understand 
how even if numerically more limited the cases of extensive interpretation are 
those that attract attention and sometimes criticism because they are placed to 
some extent as more limiting than state sovereignty (DE WAELE, 2010). This 
concerns above all the judgments concerning those that have been defined as 
constitutional issues (CONWAY, 2012) that once resolved in favor of integration 
are the ones that succeeded in consolidating themselves through the careful use 
that CJEU made the jurisprudential precedent69.
With regard to this discussion, it appears to be founded the opinion of Edward 
which has affirmed that: “(...) to say that a court is activist tells us only about the 
speaker’s view of the nature of the law and judges role (...)” (EDWARD, 1996, p. 
32). Weatherill also notes the difficulty of identifying a parameter against which 
to evaluate CJEU attitude as an activist (WEATHERILL, 2003) and indicates how 
it should be placed in relation with its ability to convince internal judges and 
member states of the validity of its arguments, becoming a question of persua-
sion rather than legitimacy (MUIR; DAWSON; DE WITTE, 2013; TRIDIMAS, 1996; 
ARNULL, 2013; LENAERTS, 2013; EVERLING, 1994). In final analysis it is neces-
sary to separate the profile of choices opportunity made by CJEU, which in cer-
tain circumstances may be debatable (ARNULL, 2006) from that of their legiti-
macy which is instead unquestionable (MERTENS DE WILMARS, 1985; EDWARD, 
1996; TRIDIMAS, 1996; TEMPLE LANG, 2011)70. It was observed that: “(...) the 
66 “(...) judges cannot avoid taking “political” decisions if by that you mean that they have to take 
decisions which have political consequences. But htat does not mean that the judges themselves 
are acting as politicians or deciding cases for political reasons (...)” (EDWARD, 1996-1997, p. 69).
67 “(...) il doit leur donner tout leur sens et faire porter à leurs dispositions toutes les consèquences 
utiles, explicites ou implicites que la lettre et l’esprit commandent (...)” (LECOURT, 1976, p. 238).
68 “(...) in the majority of cases, the decision will be to the detriment of member states trying to 
preserve certain sovereign rights or interests (...)” (DE WAELE, 2010, p. 15).
69 “(...) a proper use of a “precedent-oriented” approach is only meaningful if it is coupled with a 
teleological and meta-teleological legal reasoning (...)” (POIARES MADURO, 2007, p. 146).
70 “(...) a superior principle in the light of which the case has to be resolved (...)” (CONSTANTINESCO, 
2000, p. 80).
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question is neither whether the Court uses policy arguments nor whether it goes 
beyond the literal meaning of legal provisions. The question is rather whether 
and by what considerations its decision are justified or at very least, rationally 
justifiable (...)” (BENGOETXEA; MACCORMICK; MORAL SORIANO, 2001, p. 45).
Weatherill reports appropriately how the argumentative approach followed 
by CJERU was different in the early decades of European integration - up until 
the first treaty reform with the Single European Act of 1986 - how it laid the 
solid foundation of EU legal order71, and the subsequent period in which member 
states took of defining their contours and limits more precisely and its role was 
less active (LENAERTS, 2013). From the point of view of the dynamic boost in 
favor of the consolidation of this legal order produced by CJEU through the teleo-
logical interpretation of EU law, it has attenuated at the moment in which it was 
consolidated and member states started to modify the original founding trea-
ties, summarizing greater control over the integration process as a rule, accept-
ing the evolutionary solutions contained in CJEU jurisprudence, but in some way 
“irrigating” it in written provisions and reducing the room for maneuver that the 
original founding treaties gave it.
In more recent times, member states have also introduced in the treaties 
certain rules that envisage developments that are different from those long envi-
sioned in court’s evolutionary jurisprudence. One of the fundamental choices 
made with the Treaty of Lisbon concerns precisely the question of competences 
with a repeated reference, sometimes even redundant, to the principle of attri-
bution and to the circumstance for which the competences not attributed to EU 
belong to member states (think of articles 1, letters 1, 4, paragraphs 1 and 5, 
paragraph 1 and 2 TEU). We also refer to the provisions that expressly provide 
that in matters of concurrent competence, states may act to the extent that the 
union does not do so and that they “again exercise their competence to the extent 
that the union has decided to cease one’s exercise”72 also art. 28, par. 2 TEU pro-
vides that future treaty revision projects may be aimed at increasing or reducing 
EU powers73.
More generally, it seems to me that with the Treaty of Lisbon an increased 
sensitivity of member states towards the configuration of EU has emerged as an 
entity which, although autonomous, has ample but not unlimited competences. 
71 “(...) the court is aware of the changing institutional and constitutional environment and it is 
responding to it (...)” (WEATHERILL, 2003, p. 256).
72 Art. 2, par. 2 TFEU. For further details see: HATJE, A.; TERHECHTE, J. P.; MÜLLER-GRAFF, P. C. 
Europarechtswissenschaft. In: NOMOS, B. B.; SCHWARZE, J.; BECKER, V.; HATJE, A.; SCHOO, J. EU-
Kommentar. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2019.
73 See declaration n. 19 attached to the treaties concerning the delimitation of competence.
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It is possible that this also constitutes a manifestation of a ventilation system of 
member states with respect to the sometimes excessive use of teleological inter-
pretation, almost a defensive reflex of closure protecting its own sovereignty. 
This is accompanied by the transformation of the national dimension relative to 
the application of the principle of subsidiarity and to the control over the respect 
of the same, entrusted to member states parliaments74.
The fact that there is no legal obligation for member states to continue to 
be part of the Union indefinitely is also significant. In this regard, the withdrawal 
clause introduced by art. 50 of the Treaty of Lisbon confirms the international-
ist base of EU by writing down a previously legitimate possibility, even in the 
absence of an express provision in this regard, and determining the procedures 
relating to such withdrawal. They are known to have been activated by the United 
Kingdom in March of 2017.
The principle of loyal cooperation has been redefined in Lisbon, precisely on 
the basis of CJEU’s jurisprudence in the sense that EU and member states respect 
each other and assist one another (art. 4, par. 3 TEU), while originally it was 
referring only to the attitude that member states should have held in connection 
with EU. And it seems to me that even the reference to respect for national iden-
tity, inserted with the Treaty of Maastriht and later reiterated and extended with 
the Treaty of Lisbon (art. 4, par. 2 TEU), shows a clear position of states members 
in defense of their sovereign prerogatives, as confirmed by the jurisprudence of 
several of their constitutional courts.
The possibility of starting an enhanced cooperation with the Treaty of 
Amsterdam and confirmed in the subsequent reform treaties appears to be a limit 
to the use of the teleological interpretation of EU law. It seems to me that art. 20, 
par. 1 TEU, where it states that this mechanism is aimed at promoting the achieve-
ment of the objectives of the union only among some member states which pre-
cludes the possibility for CJEU to recall those objectives also with regard to states 
not participating in the enhanced cooperation. If a state chooses to stay out of 
enhanced cooperation, it would appear that it chose to remain outside a strength-
ened cooperation, in fact it would be incongruous for the objective pursued by it 
to appear to him as a consequence of a teleological jurisprudential interpretation.
According to our opinion CJEU has made extensive use of its prerogatives 
in order to strengthen the right of the union and expand EU competences, in this 
74 Art. 5, par. 2 TEU, and Protocol n. 2. For further details see: MARTUCCI, F. Droit de l’Union euro-
pèenne. Paris: LGDG, 2017. Also: POIARES MADURO, M.; WIND, M. The transformation of Europe: 
Twenty-five years on. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017, p. 321. And: MANGAS MAR-
TÍN, A. Tratado de la Uniòn Europea, Tratado de Funcionamiento. Madrid: Marcial Pons, 2018.
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confirmed by the choices of member states and European institutions to follow 
up some of its statements, amending the treaties established or approving acts of 
secondary law. In its jurisprudence it has used different interpretative methods 
with a particular preference for the teleological one. I believe that while this way 
of proceeding could be understandable in the first decades of operation of the 
European community, since it also constituted a necessary element in order to 
affirm the relevance and autonomy of the Community legal order compared to 
those of the member states in the context of a strongly sectorial system, it in the 
present moment in which EU has very significant powers, is less practicable. In 
this regard it is noted that harmonization is a widely acquired datum and is no 
longer an objective to be achieved and the same can be said for the primacy of 
European law over those of member states and for many other principles taken 
in the past by CJEU. The signaled choice made with the Treaty of Lisbon, to make a 
repeated reference to the limit that the union derives from the powers attributed, 
also concerns the teleological method in the interpretation of EU law. It seems to 
me that even in this respect the spaces for a further spontaneous development of 
European law have been reduced, perhaps started and supported by an extensive 
or dynamic interpretation of CJEU. In the current phase of the integration pro-
cess the need for the union to assert itself and find its space (DE WAELE, 2010)75, 
is less felt, also through a wide recourse to the teleological method76, referred to 
its original form (TEMPLE LANG, 2011).
4. The importance in EU law of interpretation rules applicable 
to international treaties
CJEU in some judgments dating back to the early years of the integration 
process, also referred to rules provided by international law for the purpose of 
interpreting the (then) community treaties (KUIJPER , 2011), with particular 
reference to a literal interpretation77. But it is indisputable that already in the 
years immediately following, it declared that it did not consider itself in any way 
75 “(...) since 1990 the European court has begun to appear less willing to give judgments of the leg-
islative kind (...) this probably represents prudence in the face of increasing criticism, rather than a 
change of the heart. In a different climate the court might well resume its old ways (...)” (HARTLEY, 
1996, p. 29).
76 “(...) sera ètabli et assurè, je crois qu’il èprouvera moins le besoin de justifier son existence ou de se 
justifier lui-même par des gestes spectaculaires et qu’il acceptera, parce qu’il sera acceptè, de jouer 
son propre rôle d’une façon plus tranquille et à voix moins haute (...)” (HAMSON, 1976, p. 29).
77 CJEU, C-1/54, France v. High Authority of 21 December 1954, ECLI:EU:C:1954:7, I-00001. C-2/54, 
Italy v. High Authority of 21 December 1954, ECLI:EU:C:1954:8, I-00037. C-3/54, ASSIDER of 11 
February 1955, ECLI:EU:C:1955:2, I-00063. C-4/54, ISA of 11 February 1955, ECLI:EU:C:1955:3, 
I-00091. See for further analysis: DERLÉN, M.; LINDHOLM, J. The Court of Justice of the EU: Multi-
disciplinary pespectives. Oxford; Oregon: Hart Publishing, 2018.
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bound by the interpretative methods mainly used for international treaties and it 
developed its own interpretative strategy which attributes greater importance to 
the systematic method and above all to the teleological method (WEATHERILL, 
2003)78. CJEU has not used an interpretation system with reference to instituting 
treaties (through the criteria of international law) and secondary law (through 
those of domestic law) (LENAERTS, 2007), with respect to which no interpreta-
tion could have the interpretative rules provided by the Vienna Convention on 
Law of Treaties (VCLT) and CJEU has since its first rulings rejected the ordinary 
meaning of a term, in favor of its community meaning79.
The validity of the approach followed by CJEU also derives from art. 5 of the 
same VCLT on the basis of which it is applied in relation to treaties establishing 
international organizations, unless otherwise provided for by the pertinent rules 
of the organization (BECK, 2016). This justifies the legitimacy of use of specific 
interpretative methods in the context of these, including EU.
The opinion of CJEU clearly emerges from the thought of one of its members, 
judge Kutscher, according to whom the peculiar character of the Union implies 
that the interpretative rules of international treaties cannot generally be applied 
to the interpretation of EU treaties (PESCATORE, 19--)80. Even when CJEU used 
the interpretative rules of VCLT it did not do so by virtue of a legal obligation, but 
for a choice of opportunities assessed case by case (KUIJPER, 1988).
And some of his judgments have been expressly different from art. 31 
VCLT. For example in C-327/91, France v. Commission sentence of 9 August 
199481 acknowledged that “a simple practice cannot prevail over the rules of 
treaty”82 and in Opinion 1/94 of 15 November 1994 reiterated that “according 
to the constant jurisprudence of the court, a mere practice of the Council can-
not derogate according to treaty rules and cannot therefore create a precedent 
that binds EU institutions as regards the determination of the correct legal 
basis (...)”83 and that the conclusions reached by it “cannot be modified based 
78“(...) EC law’s supposed divergence frm orthodox public international law is m ore a question of 
words than substance (...)” (EDWARD, 1996-1997, p. 70).
79 CJEU, C-30/59, De Gezamenlijke Steenkolenmijnen of 23 February 1961. Degan (1963) affirmed 
that “(...) par cette pratique, la cour de Luxembourg s’est plutôt rapporchèe d’une juridiction in-
terne que d’un tribunal proprement international (...)».80 “(...) forme contraste avec les mèthodes traditionnelles du droit international, marquèes d’un 
indèniable statisme (...)” (KUTSCHER, 1976, p. 31).81CJEU, C-327/91, France v. Commission of 9 August 1994, ECLI:EU: C: 1994: 305, I-03641.82CJEU, C-327/91, France v. Commission of 9 August 1994, op. cit., par. 36
83 Par. 52, which the CJEU has referred to the precedent case: C-68/86, United Kingdom v. Council 
of 23 February 1988, ECLI:EU:C:1961:85, I-00855.
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on an institutional practice consisting of autonomous measures or external 
agreements (...)”84.
In a different profile, with reference to provisions interpretation belonging 
to treaties concluded by the Community/Union with other international sub-
jects, in some cases CJEU has also declared how much they use identical terms 
to those of a provision of European law, in line with as it has long held concern-
ing the autonomy of the meaning of the terms used in EC legal system, different 
methods must be used for the purposes of their interpretation (SOREL; BORÉ 
EVENO, 2011). For example in C-270/80, Polydor case of 9 February 198285 CJEU 
faced with provisions of an agreement between ECCs and Portugal, drafted in 
terms similar to those of ECC treaty, found that for interpretative purposes:
this textual analogy does not is a sufficient reason to transpose to the 
system of the agreement CJEU jurisprudence which determines, with-
in the community, the relationship between the protection of indus-
trial and commercial property rights and rules on the free movement 
of goods (...) aims through the establishment of a common market and 
gradual approximation of member states economic policies, the fusion 
of national markets into a single market with the characteristics of an 
internal market (...) (CJEU, 1982). 
In C-17/81, Pabst case of 29 April 198286, concerning the interpretation of 
some rules of the EEC treaty and the association agreement between the then 
EEC and Greece. CJEU interpreted the provision of the association agreement, for-
mulated in terms similar to that of the treaty, in the same way, attributing it also 
the direct effect. In this regard, however, the circumstance highlighted by CJEU 
that the association agreement was inserted “in a set of provisions that have the 
purpose of preparing the entry of Greece into the community (...)” (CJEU, 1982)87.
In the aforementioned opinion 1/91 of 14 December 1991, CJEU has expressly 
acknowledged: “(...) the identical literal tenor of provisions of the agreement and 
84 CJEU, C-68/86, United Kingdom v. Council of 23 February 1988, op. cit., par. 61
85 CJEU, C-270/80, Polydor and others of 9 February 1982, ECLI:EU:C:1982:43, I-00329.
86 CJEU, C-17/81, Pabst & Richard KG v. Hauptzollamt Oldenburg of 29 April 1982, 
ECLI:EU:C:1982:129, I-01331.
87 Also the case: T-115/94, Opel Austria of 22 January 1997, ECLI:EU:T:1997:3, II-00039, concern-
ing the free trade agreement between the EC and the agreement on the European economic area, 
which states that it results from the jurisprudence that in order to establish whether the interpre-
tation of an EEC regulation can be extended to an identical standard of an agreement like the EEA 
agreement, it must be analyzed in the light of both the object and purpose of the agreement itself, 
and its context (...) (par. 106). See also case: C-163/90, Legros of 16 July 1992, ECLI:EU:C:1992:326, 
I-04625. For further details: TATHAM, A. F. Central european constitutional courts in the face of EU 
memberships. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2013, p. 196.
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the corresponding Community provisions does not imply that both must neces-
sarily be interpreted in the same way (...)”. The reason is that they are placed in 
different contexts, the one creates rights and obligations between the contracting 
parties, the others are part of an order in which member states transfer a part of 
their sovereignty; objectives (teleological method) and the context (systematic 
method) of an international treaty and European treaties are different.
Consequently CJEU denies that these international agreements produce the 
same consequences that it attributes to EU treaties88. In opinion 1/91, however, 
it explicitly referred to rules on the interpretation of art. 31 VCLT which he had 
already implicitly used in the Polydor sentence of 198289 placing emphasis on 
the object and purpose of a treaty. In this judgment CJEU used ordinary rules of 
interpretation of a treaty in order to obtain the exceptional character of EU law 
and its legal system.
CJEU uses the nature and structure of an international treaty including those 
of which the Community/Union is a part, sometimes for the purpose of assessing 
whether the international agreement can produce direct effects through joined 
cases C-21 to 24/72, International Fruit sentence of 12 December 197290 for 
interpretative purposes only91. In this respect CJEU has in its applied jurispru-
dence the discipline set by VCLT including its rules of interpretation, confirming 
its customary nature. As a rule, it is used in relation to international agreements 
applicable in European law (such as the WTO agreements or the Montego Bay 
88 CJEU, C-149/96, Portugal v. Council of 23 November 1999, ECLI:EU:C:1999:574, I-08395.89 See opinion 2/00 of 6 December 2001. C-312/91, Metalsa of 1st July 1993, ECLI:EU:C:1993:273, 
I-03751, par. 12. In case C-416/96, El-Yassini of 2 March 1999, ECLI:EU:C:1999:107, I-01209, said 
that: “(...) in accordance with a constant jurisprudence an international treaty must be interpreted 
not only in the same way as the terms in which it is drafted, but also in light of its objectives Article 
31 VCLT in this respect states that a treaty must be interpreted in good faith, according to the com-
mon sense to be attributed to its terms in their context , and in the light of its object and its purpose 
(...)” (CJEU, 1999). In the same spirit of orientation see: C-268/99, Janys and others of 20 November 
2001, ECLI: EU: C: 2001:616, I-08615. For further analysis see: CHALMERS, D.; DAVIES, G.; MONTI, 
G. European Union law. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014.90 CJEU, joined cases C-21 to 24/72, International Fruit of 12 December 1972, ECLI:EU:C:1972:115, 
I-01219, parr. 26-28 and the case: C-12/86, Demirel of 30 September 1987, ECLI:EU:C:1987:400, 
I-03719. For further analysis see: CONANT, L. J.; Justice contained law and politic in the EU. Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 2018. HARTKAMP, A.; SIBURGH, C.; DEVROE, W. Cases, materials and text 
on European Union law and private law. Oxford; Oregon; Portland: Hart Publishing, 2017. CONWAY, 
G. European Union law. London; New York: Routledge, 2015. NICOLA, F.; DAVIES, B. European Union 
law stories. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017.91 CJEU, C-308/06, Intertanko and others of 3 June 2008, ECLI: EU: C: 2008: 312, I-04057. For fur-
ther details see: CREMONA, M.; THIES, A. The European Court of Justice and external relations law. 
Oxford; Oregon; Portland: Hart Publishing. 2014. CREMONA, M.; MICKLITZ, H. W. Private law in 
the external relations of the European Union. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016. PATTERSON, 
D.; SÖDERSTEN, A. A companion to European Union and international law. New York: Wiley & Sons, 
2016.
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Convention on the Law of the Sea), interpretative methods that are more restric-
tive than those used for EU law provisions, as corresponding to VCLT. Later he 
stated in C-162/96, Racke sentence of 16 June 199892 (concerning the inter-
pretation of a cooperation agreement between EEC and Yugoslavia), that the 
Community/Union “is obliged to respect the norms of customary international 
law”93 in C-386/08, Brita case of 25 February 201094 relating to EU-Israel asso-
ciation agreement, CJEU stated that it is governed by international law and that 
with respect to its interpretation, the law of treaties codified by VCLT applies to 
the extent the treaty law codified by VCLT to the extent that it constitutes the 
expression of customary international law95. It added that “(...) although not 
binding for the convention of Vienna, they reflect the norms of customary inter-
national law which, as such, bind the institutions of the community and form part 
of the Community legal order (...)”96; among these CJEU expressly referred to art. 
31 of the Convention97.
In its jurisprudence CJEU has applied the rules of interpretation of the trea-
ties not only to those concluded between EU and third states, but also to the right 
derived from them. The most important example concerns the decisions of the 
council established by the association agreements (KUIJPER, 1988).
In finis, CJEU has sometimes interpreted an international agreement of 
which the Community/Union is not a contracting party simply in order to under-
stand if European law could be interpreted in conformity with it98. The circum-
stance that the interpretative rules of VCLT are also used in CJEU jurisprudence 
today no longer with reference to EU treaties but to the agreements concluded 
between EU and other international subjects, it confirms the customary charac-
ter. A recurrent element in the interpretation of international treaties as it has 
been reported includes those establishing international organizations is the ref-
92 CJEU, C-162/96, Racke v. Hauptzollamt Mainz of 16 July 1998, ECLI:EU:C:1998:293, I-03655
93 CJEU, C-162/96, Racke v. Hauptzollamt Mainz of 16 July 1998, op. cit., par. 45.
94 C-386/08, Brita of 25 February 2010, ECLI:EU:C:2010:91, I-01289.
95 C-386/08, Brita of 25 February 2010, op. cit., par. 39-41. See also KUIJPER, 1988. 
96 The CJEU has referred the case: El-Yassini of 2 March 1999.
97 C-386/08, Brita of 25 February 2010, op. cit., par. 42-43. also in the same orientation the case: 
C-104/16, Council v. Polisario Front of 21 December 2016, ECLI:EU:C:2016:973, published in the 
electronic Reports of the cases, in which the CJEU reiterates that in the interpretation of an interna-
tional agreement of which the EC is a part (in speciem, the liberalization agreement with Morocco) 
“ the court was required to respect “the rules set by art. 31 VCLT (...) “(par. 86). For further details 
see: LYONS, T. EU customs law. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018. CZUCZAI, J.; NAERTS, F. The 
European Union as a global actor. Bridging legal theory and practice: Liber amicorum in honour of 
Ricardo Gosalbo Bono. The Hague: Brill, 2017.98 CJEU, C-344/04, IATA and ELFAA of 10 January 2006, ECLI:EU:C:2006:10, I-00403. See also: 
D.A.O. EDWARD, R. LANE, Edward and Lane on European Union law, op. cit.,
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erence to the useful effect of rules to be interpreted. It is interesting to consider 
the importance that the useful effect has in this context, in order to understand 
how CJEU used it, in the light of the examination just carried out, of the interpre-
tative methods of the Community/EU law.
Concluding Remarks
According to the author opinion the differences regarding the acknowledg-
ment recognized in every type of interpretation referring to EU order does not 
follow the notion of useful effect (which is not part of our analysis research) 
which is indeed sufficiently broad to include its various meanings. These are dif-
ferences concerning the privileged interpretative strategy. What changes is the 
way it is used by the interpreter to pursue a more or less broad interpretation. 
And this also notes in relation to the examined traceability to the notions of effi-
cacy and effectiveness, present both in the interpretation of international trea-
ties, including those instituting international organizations and in the interpreta-
tion of Union treaties and more generally of the European legal system.
To this end, reference has been made to the principle of legal certainty 
as well as to the objectives of law itself as limits to interpretation but it is well 
understood that these are completely general concepts and perhaps not very 
effective, especially when compared with a peculiar order like that of the Union.
It seems to me that greater importance should be given to the position that 
seeks to identify the limits to the use of various principles alongside the inter-
pretation of Union law, in particular that of attribution powers and that of loyal 
cooperation. There are no strict criteria, but honestly, in the light of the analysis 
conducted, we do not believe that at least the current state of CJEU’s jurispru-
dence is possible to identify other precise limits in the face of such a flexible and 
rather extensive notion.
In the light of the brief research conducted, it seems to us that in the current 
phase of the process of European integration the spaces have been reduced for 
a further “spontaneous” development of the Union legal order, perhaps initiated 
and supported by an extensive or dynamic interpretation of CJEU. In the last few 
years, it has been using the current state of affairs in a conservative way.
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